Demographic Security Trends in Southeastern Europe by Dario Malnar & Ana Malnar
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (73) - 2015
57




Demographic Security Trends in 
Southeastern Europe
Dario Malnar, Ana Malnar
Abstract
Over the past three decades we have witnessed an evolution of the concept of security in general 
and of demographic security as a specific field of security studies. The approach to security has been 
changing both in regards to a widening of subjects and referent objects of security, and a widening 
of the security domain. Consideration of the demographic component in the security sphere has 
evolved in accordance with this development; the scope of perspectives through which demographic 
security is viewed and defined has expanded – the population composition, population dynamics 
and human capital paradigm. Aspects of demographics and security are in continuous interaction and 
interdependence which significantly determines demographic security and national security.
The aim of this paper is to establish a specific link between demographic security and security in 
ten post-socialist countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE). In accordance with this aim, an analysis 
has been made of the compositional elements and population dynamics in order to determine 
demographic security of the observed states. The analysis indicates unfavourable demographic 
security, and negative demographic composition and dynamics in most of observed states, which 
suggests that demographic security will have a continuing negative impact on the security of the 
countries analysed and the region as a whole.
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Introduction
Population is, along with territory and sovereign authority, the constituent 
element of the state as a permanent and organised community.1 
Population is the foundation of all territorial, regional, economic, social 
and other sorts of planning, a fundamental territorial resource and 
potential and is – in every country – of national strategic interest (Šterc 
and Komušanac 2011: 693).
The study of population – demos2 – and changes related to the population 
is therefore a permanent activity of the institutions that shape social, 
cultural, political, economic, as well as security, segments of the social 
and state system.
In public, the problem of the population was for a long time 
confined to real and potential numbers of the population, its 
implications on comparative development and the power of 
certain countries and, at the global level to the implications on 
general conditions of development and survival of people on our 
planet. In contrast, in the last fifty years, attention has been drawn 
to the problems of dynamic and structural interdependence and 
patterns of demographic development, whereby demographic 
factors are not autonomous, but they, along with economic, 
technological, social, political and environmental factors, make 
up a set of conditions, causes and consequences of a unique 
social development process (Wertheimer-Baletić 1999: xiii).
The development of security studies is also characterised by the widening 
of the context in which security is observed, starting with the expansion of 
the thematic area to areas through which security is defined. Of particular 
importance is the contribution from members of the Copenhagen School 
whose work has established a foothold for the consideration of security in 
a widened and deepened context as compared to the previous period 
1 More on the issue of the constituent elements of the state in the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(Montevideo Convention)
2 The population of a state is a community of people which consists of the citizens of the state and of foreigners who 
have continuously inhabited the territory of that state (Degan 2000: 228).
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focusing on state security through military power and demographic trends. 
“Demographic phenomena per se are seldom the cause of conflict … 
demographic factors are therefore to be viewed as one set of many 
factors potentially contributing to armed conflict, interacting with others 
in complex series of linkages” (Nichiporuk 2000: xi). Demographic changes 
more often incite internal crises, and even conflicts that subsequently 
have the potential for wider destabilisation – refugee waves, using 
opposing sides to conduct a proxy war, and similar. At the same time, 
demographic features and trends have without a doubt had an impact 
on the geopolitical picture and relationships in a certain area.
The end of the Cold War prompted a consideration of security which 
changed the prevailing concept of focusing on the state and military 
power. As the work of the Copenhagen School broadened the definition of 
security, security studies began to deal with the factors that also emerged 
in the demographic studies discussed by Wertheimer-Baletić, and the 
notion of security was widened to include political, economic, military, 
societal and environmental security. It was clear that “the nature of the 
future international security environment will be determined by complex 
interactions between geopolitical alignments, technological advances, 
economic developments, demographic factors, and environmental 
trends” (Nichiporuk 2000: 1). 
It is without doubt that modern security studies view demographic 
development as a determinant security factors and that demographic 
factors may represent an indication of the security situation and possible 
changes. 
The aim of this paper is to determine the correlation between demographic 
security and aspects of security as defined by the Copenhagen School, 
and subsequently to define the demographic security of ten SEE states. 
These are countries that in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the 20th 
century entered the transition process from single-party and directed 
economy socialist/communist regimes to a democratic and free market 
system.3
3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia.
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Security and population
The traditional concept of security, based on a realistic approach 
as defined by Morghentau (1967) and his followers, was focused on 
protection of the territorial integrity of the state and its defence against 
the attack of another state.4 The object of security is the state itself and the 
concept is primarily based on the security of the state.5 The security effect 
of the population was seen principally as a function of how an aggregate 
population size affected the power potential of a given nation state. 
Nichiporuk calls this intellectual approach “static” and emphasises that 
it “saw population size and density as being one independent variable in 
an aggregate “bucket of capabilities” that determined a country’s level 
of power and influence in international system” (Nichiporuk 2000: 5).
The traditional concept of security prevailed during the Cold War both 
in democratic and totalitarian states, however, even though totalitarian 
states at the time, with regard to the concept of international security, 
based their approach to security on a realistic concept and their 
approach to population on a static concept, they also saw the population 
in another, intrastate context. 
In totalitarian states there is no clear definition of national security. Those 
matters are mistaken for the security of the ruling elite or ideal state as the 
organisation superior to the nation (Podolski 1999: 46). It is in this context, in 
the intrastate sphere, that the population is also viewed, and is segmented 
along ideological, ethnic, and social lines. The homogeneity and potential 
of a group, separately or in correlation with other groups, for provoking 
intrastate ethnic or ideologically motivated conflicts, as a threat to the 
regime’s security, is assessed. The demographic structure and processes 
influencing the creation of hyper nations and ideological patterns are 
also analysed. This approach widened the context in which impact of 
demographic factors on state power and security was observed, and 
therefore the components and content of demographic security as well. 
The approach was dynamic in character. 
4 This approach reflects the definition of national security as was given by Luciani that “National security can be defined 
as the ability to resist external aggression” (Luciani 1989: 151).
5 See (Vilijams 2012: 46).
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In the wider international context the dynamic approach was developed 
and strengthened during the 1980s and 1990s. Nichiporuk states that “this 
dynamic paradigm emphasizes not population size as a component 
of national power calculations but rather the interactions between 
population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, 
resource depletion, forced refugee flows, ethnic conflict, hypernationalism, 
and urbanization […]” (Nichiporuk 2000: 6).
The development of elements of the dynamic paradigm, as it is called by 
Nichiporuk, coincides with tendencies in the development of a modern 
concept of security developed after the concept of security had been 
affected by the fundamental changes in the security environment 
after the Cold War. One could even say that there has been a shift 
from the state as a central subject of security to people as groups and 
individuals. This shift in security studies was initiated by Barry Buzan and 
then further developed in his work and the work of theorists associated 
with the Copenhagen School.6 Buzan expanded the understanding of 
the concept of security by widening it into five fields: military, economic, 
environmental, political and societal security. “Referent objects can be 
the state (military security); national sovereignty, or an ideology (political 
security); national economies (economic security); collective identities 
(societal security); species or habitats (environmental security)“ (Buzan et 
al. 1998). The perception of security has become more subjective and 
individualised. The modern concept of security views population trends 
through their impact on a country’s potential to meet the needs of the 
population and ensure the protection of common and individual rights. As 
Grizold (1998: 32) states, it is about “...activities which ensure fulfilment of 
societies basic functions (socio-economic, socio-political, psycho-social, 
cultural, ecological and other)”.
In the modern concept of security the psychological dimension-what 
make us feel secure or insecure - has gained priority over the physical, 
and stems directly from the population and its structure, particularly 
from personal values. A strengthening of the psychological dimensions 
of security is compatible with demographic development, which marks 
the second demographic transition (SDT). According to the original SDT 
6 It is primarily about the Barry Buzan’s book “People, states and fear” 1983, following the research and studies of Buzan, 
Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde..
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concept, large scale changes in family and reproductive behaviour are 
the consequence of cultural and ideational changes (e.g. a shift towards 
secular individualism and an orientation towards personal self-fulfilment) 
driven primarily by economic affluence (Van de Kaa 1987). 
So demographic security “...is not only to assess the direct impact of 
demographic trends on population numbers, economic size, and defense 
capabilities, but also to consider how these trends may indirectly affect 
capabilities by altering economic performance, social temperament, 
and national goals.” (Jackson and Howe 2008: 1)
Herd and Sargsyan, in their study of Russian demographic security 
noticed that aging, shifts in ethnic distribution and migrations from rural 
to urban areas influence political security. Voter turnout and orientation 
is partially influenced by the age composition of the population (Herd 
and Sergsyan 2007: 55). Shifts in the ethnic structure, prompted either by 
natural movement or migration, also influence the political preferences of 
the population in a particular area, and in the case of inter-ethnic security 
dilemmas or conflicts may lead to radicalisation of political views and the 
articulation of such views through election results. 
The economic component of security is also dependent on the structure of 
the population. The level of socio-economic development of a particular 
region is a true reflection and direct indicator of the demographic 
processes that are the demographic status of that particular region (Lajić 
2010: 17).
The composition of the population is a determining development factor. In 
all types of society the population enters the economic process in a double 
role, as a producer – determining the overall labour potential of a country 
and at the same time as a consumer – determining the demographic 
dimensions of the domestic market and important characteristics of 
overall, and especially personal consumption (Wertheimer-Baletić 1999: 
4). 
Leahy and Peoples (2008), have underlined the implications of population 
aging on the economic potential of society by stating that:
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“As populations progress through the demographic transition, an 
opportunity for economic growth, known as the ‘demographic 
dividend’ arises. And, once death rates and birth rates decline 
due to investment in health, working-age adults make up the 
greatest share of population for a few decades and there are 
relatively small groups of dependent children and other adults. The 
lower dependency ratio can lead to higher savings and wages, 
greater per-capita spending on health and education at both 
household and governmental level, and increased participation 
of women in the labour force. These factors help boost national 
economies... The timeframe for countries to take advantage 
of this demographic window of opportunity is relatively narrow, 
often 40 to 60 years, lasting only until the median age of the 
population increases and dependency ratios rise again with the 
higher proportion of older adults (Leahy and Peoples 2008: 43-44).
Another consequence of population aging is the additional burden for 
pension, health and social funds. This situation, especially in the case of 
a society underdeveloped in human capital and technology, reduces 
society’s productivity and prompts negative impacts on the economy. 
In demographic-economic relations, there is distinct negative correlation 
at the global level. Developing countries with the strongest population 
pressures and the highest rates of population growth, yet economically 
challenged, are characterised by low domestic product, both aggregate 
and per capita (Wertheimer-Baletić 1999: 103). In contrast there are 
developed countries with very low rates of population growth, but high 
domestic aggregate and per capita product.
Finally there is a third paradigm defined by Nichiporuk taking into account 
the human capital of population and national power. This view holds 
that “the quality and skill level of a labour force is the most important 
demographic variable to overall national power...” (Nichiporuk 2000: 8).
This is particularly reflected in the economic component of security in 
states whose economies are based on the technological potential of skills 
existing in the workforce which is in clear correlation with productivity and 
therefore with economic growth.
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A distinct demographic factor with an impact on all aspects of security 
are migrations. What appears to matter in the case of potential conflicts 
are those cases wherein migration leads to clashes of national identity 
(Teitelbaum and Winters 1998: 197). This is when one distinct ethnic group 
migrates into an area that is considered the homeland of another ethnic 
group and challenges the dominance of the latter, here conflict is likely to 
arise (Goldstone 2002: 14). 
Graham (2000) concludes that large immigration waves can harm 
the political, cultural, societal, economic, environmental and security 
homogeneity of states that are flooded with such migrants. Graham 
adds that, viewed from a conventional security viewpoint, population 
movements would only be perceived as a threat if the influx was an 
invading army or secondarily, a large number of refugees.7 This is thus not 
only about the physical security of people, but the so-called “ontological 
security”.8
According to Leuprecht (2010), migratory influx in the case of poor 
management by government institutions, leads to the so-called security 
dilemma9 in a domicile population, or in the case of demographic trends, 
a demographic security dilemma. This is a situation of mutual fear which 
encourages a chain of self-protective aimed actions and reactions 
between the domicile population and the newcomers, which may 
ultimately lead to a threat to national security, and even conflict.10
A percentage of foreigners amounting to 10% are enough to create 
tension among various ethnic groups (Soffer 2008: 16). Finally, a rise in legal 
or illegal immigration may eventually lead to xenophobic extremism.
7 Cited by Soffer, A., 2008. The Connection between Demography and National and International Security – The Case 
of the E.U. National Security and the Future, 1-2 (9) 2008. p. 10.
8 Leuprecht (2010) states that security is ontological security writ large, that is, the security of self, of individual and group 
identity and the environment (s) necessary to sustain that identity. The presumption is that ontological security is no less 
important to states, groups and individuals than physical security (Leuprecht 2010: 61).
9 The concept of security dilemma is primarily employed in the neorealist branch of international relations theory 
and emphasises the anarchic environment in which states exist. The concept of the security dilemma is based on 
the presumption that upgrading of a country’s defense capabilities fosters a sense of threat in other countries and 
stimulates them to strengthen their own defence potential. In this way, the countries involved enter a continuous chain 
of actions and reactions that can lead to conflict. For more on the security dilemma, see Snow (2007: 166).
10 See (Leuprecht 2010: 62-63).
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Bearing in mind the power transition theory,11 such changes may on a 
regional or even municipal level lead to situations where a minority 
becomes the threat to the majority. In such situations, the struggle for the 
preservation of power by the majority and the demand for a redistribution 
of power from the growing minority may cause crises, and threats to 
national security. These are exactly the situations the SEE region faced in 
the outbreak of crises and armed conflicts during the last decade of the 
20th century.
Threats arising from the changed relationships between minority and 
majority communities are particularly evident in sparsely populated areas.
Defined aspects of demographic security are broad, and connected 
to a population’s composition, dynamics and human capital potential. 
In this paper we address demographic security through the elements 
of composition and dynamics according to Cincotta who addresses 
demographic security through elements of: 
 ● A population’s size, age structure, geographic distribution, or ethnic 
composition
 ● Changes in these demographic conditions and interactions 
between them, including migration, population growth, shifts in 
the age structure, and changing location and proportion of ethnic 
and religious groups (Cincota 2004: 24).
The ethnic structure of the population, as a particularly important 
component of demographic security and security in the SEE region and 
the issues of human capital paradigm due to their complexity, requires a 
separate analysis and is not the subject of interest in this paper.
11 Power transition theory was developed by Organski. With this theory he provided the basis for understanding causes 
of conflict between states in situations where the parties find themselves in conditions of power parity. These are 
situations in which the growing power seeks for change in power relations, and the existing power tends to preserve its 
position (Organski 1968) and (Organski Abramo and Kugler 1981).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (73) - 2015
66
Demographic characteristics of South Eastern 
Europe
Through analysis of the population development, age structure and the 
total fertility rates in ten selected SEE countries we will identify specific 
demographic developments in the region and their impact on the definition 
of demographic security. Taking into account different methodological 
approaches and the inconsistent temporal dynamics of the censuses 
in the selected countries, as well as the reconfiguration of states at a 
given time period, the data from the World Bank will be used. The World 
Banks data on particular important demographic parameters allows the 
necessary level of methodological coherence and comparability.
The total population (Table 1) in the countries of this region declined in the 
period from 1980 to 2010, in all countries except Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Slovenia, which demonstrated continuous, yet modest growth in 
population. In Bulgaria, the total population has declined in the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries. Between 1980 and 1990 the population was 
reduced by 143,246 inhabitants, and in the period between 2000 and 2010 
the population was further reduced by as many as 635,883 inhabitants, 
which is a total of 7.534,289 inhabitants.
In Albania, the last increase in population was recorded between 1980 
and 1990, from 2,734,776 to 3,446,882 inhabitants. This was followed by a 
period of population decline to141,934 inhabitants by the year 2000 and 
by another 154,805 by the year 2010, with 3,150,143 inhabitants living there.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1980 and 1990 the population 
increased from 4,099,903 to as many as 4,526,511 inhabitants. This period 
was followed by a significant drop of 692,147 people. By the year 2010 
the trend was continuing and that very year only 3,845,929 inhabitants 
were recorded. In Bosnia and Herzegovina this trend was reinforced by 
significant losses during the war that was waged in the first half of the 1990s. 
A comparable demographic trend has also been noted in Croatia, which 
was also faced with the war in the first half of the 1990s. During the pre-war 
period between 1980 and 1990 the number of Croatian inhabitants had 
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increased, from 4,580,000 to 4,780,000 inhabitants. In the year 2000, there 
was a population decline of 354,000, this negative trend continuing until 
2010 when Croatia recorded a population of only 4,417,800.
On the other hand, Kosovo recorded a significant growth of population 
in the period 1980-1990, from 1,521,000 to 1,862,000 inhabitants. This was 
followed by a slight decrease of the population to 1,700,000 in 2000 and 
then a further increase until 2010, when 1,775,680 inhabitants lived in 
Kosovo.
In the year 1980 there were 579,880 inhabitants in Montenegro. By 1990 
the population had increased by 35,513 to 614,601. By 2000 Montenegro 
had lost 3,405 inhabitants. This decline was followed by a period of slight 
increase after which, according to data for 2010, Montenegro has 620,078 
inhabitants. 
Romania, as the most populous country of the region, recorded 22,242,653 
inhabitants in the year 1980. By1990 the population of Romania had 
increased to 23,201,835 inhabitants. Then the number of inhabitants started 
to decrease to 22,442,971 in 2000, and finally to 21,438,001 inhabitants 
in 2010. During the observed period Romania has lost nearly 10% of its 
population.
Serbia has had continuous decline of population from 1990 onwards. 
Between 1990 and 2000 Serbia lost about 70,000 residents. In 1990 the 
population was 7,586,000 and in 2000 it was 7,516,346. Such a negative 
trend continued, and in the year 2010 a total of 7,291,436 inhabitants lived 
in Serbia.
During the period analysed Slovenia recorded a slight increase in 
population. In 1980 there were 1,901,315 and in 1990 1,998,161 inhabitants. 
This was followed by a slight decline in the population until 2000 to 
1,988,925 inhabitants. Since then the demographic trend changed in 
Slovenia from negative to positive and as a result in 2010 there were 
2,048,583 inhabitants.
Throughout the analysed period 1990-2010, excluding 1980 due to a lack 
of data for Serbia, the overall population of the region was decreasing. In 
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the year 1990 these countries had a combined population of 58,743,989, 
and then until 2000 the population fell to 56,047,051. Between 1990 and 
2010 the number of inhabitants decreased by 4,519,834, so the overall 
population of the analysed SEE countries was then 54,224,155. 
Table 1.Total population of SEE countries 1980 - 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010
Albania 2,734,776 3,446,882 3,304,948 3,150,143
Bos & Herz 4,099,903 4,526,511 3,834,364 3,845,929
Bulgaria 8,861,535 8,718,289 8,170,172 7,534,289
Croatia 4,588,000 4,780,000 4,426,000 4,417,800
Kosovo 1,521,000 1,862,000 1,700,000 1,775,680
Macedonia 1,895,727 2,009,710 2,052,129 2,102,216
Montenegro 579,088 614,601 611,196 620,078
Romania 22,242,653 23,201,835 22,442,971 21,438,001
Serbia - 7,586,000 7,516,346 7,291,436
Slovenia 1,901,315 1,998,161 1,988,925 2,048,583
Source: World Bank Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.IN/countries 
(accessed 12 October 2013)
The negative demographic trend shown through the changes in total 
population of the SEE region is additionally burdened by indicators of the 
age structure (Table 2). The population’s age structure is directly associated 
with natural demographic development, migrations and other events 
important for population development, thus pointing to the past as well as 
the future. The demographic literature provides different methodologies for 
population classification by age and sex structure. In this paper we opted 
for the classification developed by experts of the United Nations according 
to the proportion of the population aged “65 and over”. This definition 
implies the dynamics and transformation of different types of population 
age structure related to the overall demographic development, by 
distinguishing three types of populations: a) the young population - with 
a proportion of elderly “65 and over” -4% or less, b) the adult population 
- with a proportion of elderly from 4% to 7%, c ) the old population - with 
a proportion of persons aged 65 years and over, more than 7% (UN, The 
Aging of Populations and its Economic and Social Implications, United 
Nations 1956). In the modern concepts of security, the age structure of the 
population, in correlation with the general potential of society in economic, 
political, social and military terms, determines the security status. 
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Table 2.Population of SEE countries – Composition by age1980- 2010
Population
Composition by age%
0 – 14 15 – 64 65  <
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Albania 38 34 30 23 57 61 63 67 5 5 7 10
Bos & Herz 28 24 20 17 66 70 69 68 6 6 11 15
Bulgaria 22 20 16 13 66 67 68 68 12 13 17 18
Croatia 22 20 17 15 68 69 67 67 11 12 16 18
Kosovo - - - 27 - - - 66 - - - 7
Macedonia 29 26 22 17 64 66 68 71 7 7 10 12
Montenegro 28 26 21 19 64 66 67 68 8 8 11 12
Romania 28 24 19 15 62 66 68 70 10 11 13 15
Serbia - 24 20 17 - 66 67 69 - 9 13 14
Slovenia 23 21 16 14 65 68 70 69 11 11 14 17
Source: World Bank Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.IN/countries 
(accessed 12 October 2013).
The age structure of the countries analysed (Table 2) clearly indicates that 
the population in as many as six countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and Slovenia, during the entire period from 1980 to 
the year 2010, had the characteristics of an old population. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia showed the characteristics of a mature 
population in 1980 and in 1990. During the period between 2000 and 2010, 
as in other countries in the region, they developed characteristics that 
indicated an old population. In the case of Albania, it was only in the 
year 2010 that the population age structure change from mature to old 
became visible, which means a ten year delay in comparison with the 
trends in other countries of the region. It is interesting to note the same 
trend in Kosovo, but with a ten year delay compared to Albania. Kosovo’s 
age structure thus had the characteristics of a mature population, with 
people over 65 years accounting for between 4 and 7 percent of the 
population. It should be noted that in 1980 and 1990 Kosovo was part of 
Serbia and for that period there is no valid demographic data.
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Table 3. Population of SEE countries - Total fertility rate 1980-2010 
1980 1990 2000 2010
Albania 3.7 3.0 2.4 1.7
Bos & Herz 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.2
Bulgaria 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.5
Croatia 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5
Kosovo 4.6* 3.9 3.0 2.3
Macedonia 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.5
Montenegro 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7
Romania 2.4 1.8 1.3 1.3
Serbia 2.1* 1.8** 1.5 1.4
Slovenia 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.5
* 1981, **1991
Source: World Bank Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN/countries 
(accessed 12 October 2013).
Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to 
a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear 
children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. Total fertility 
rate is the most dynamic and complex component in the natural change 
of population, which ultimately determines the future of a society and the 
range of structures and substructures of the population.
Among the many factors determining the level of fertility in a population, 
there are three interrelated groups: 1. biological factors, 2. economic 
and social factors and 3. psychological factors (Wertheimer-Baletić 1999). 
There is a consensus among scholars today, that the birth rate in modern 
societies is a component of the natural change of population, which 
is primarily affected by economic, social, cultural, and psychological 
factors. Demographers distinguish it as the most important determinant of 
the second demographic transition, pointing out that in most developed 
countries, fertility rates are not high enough to ensure a simple reproduction 
of the population. This trend is obvious in most SEE countries (Table 3) where 
the fertility rate in the period from 1980 to 2010 was continually declining. The 
fertility rates of all observed countries, with the exception of Kosovo, were 
below the replacement rate. The fertility rate in Kosovo decreased from 4.6 
years in 1980 to 2.3 in 2010, but is still the highest in the region, and shows 
the characteristics of a country with expanding reproduction. Albania 
demonstrated features of expanding reproduction from 1980 to 2000, but 
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in 2010 the fertility rate dropped to just 1.7, which means that there is not 
even simple reproduction. As with the age structure of the population of 
Kosovo there is a ten year delay in fertility rate trends compared to Albania, 
so we can expect that within the next decade the fertility rate of Kosovo will 
converge with the demographic characteristics of neighbouring countries.
Macedonia last recorded a replacement fertility rate of 2.2 in the year 
1990; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania 
and Serbia even earlier, in 1980. In the same year Croatia and Slovenia had 
a fertility rate of 2.0 which until 2010 dropped to only 1.5, way below the 
level of simple reproduction.
Based on that analysis of demographic parameters, we can conclude 
that in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia demographic 
development demonstrates negative characteristics or characteristics of 
stagnation. These countries are thus approaching demographic trends 
that characterise the developed countries of Europe. It is interesting to 
emphasise the ten-year lag of Albania compared to most countries in the 
region, and then the same lag from Kosovo to Albania. This indicates that in 
these countries the effect of the second demographic transition process, in 
which the natural components are primarily affected by socio-cultural and 
psychological factors, started somewhat later than in other SEE countries.
The delayed or negative demographic development of the SEE countries is 
reflected in all three analysed components: reduction or stagnation of the 
total population, the process of population aging and negative indicators 
of population reproduction. According to data from 2010, only Kosovo, with 
a total fertility rate of 2.3 percent, has fertility rate over the replacement 
rate, while the other nine countries are below the 2.1 percent which allows 
natural replacement of the population. We must point out that although 
all these changes are gradual, their effects are long-term, and reflected 
in all areas of the population as well as the overall forthcoming life of the 
population and society. We also agree with Nejašmić (2002) when he states 
that “after the tumultuous changes in the 1990s, there was a strong natural 
depopulation, that is of? decreasing reproduction of the population; there 
was a demographic collapse!” (Nejašmić 2002: 720).
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Migrations – impact on the demography of SEE 
countries
In addition to the described natural population movement in the SEE 
region, the mechanical movement of population – migration – also has a 
significant impact.
Migration is the most dynamic component of population movement and 
represents the most complex research subject in terms of content and 
methodology. 
The mobile part of the population (migration contingent) mechanically 
changes its geographical location and in proportion to its demographic 
volume “moves” all its human potential (biological, structural, cultural, 
etc.) to the region of immigration (Lajić 2010: 15). Once arrived in a new 
locality migrants may retain their attitudes, religion, language, culture and 
genetic identity for a longer or shorter period (Roberts 1988: 46).
International migration has more than doubled in the past 50 years. There 
are some 232 million international migrants today. In 2000-2009, the EU 
population gained almost 15 million people through net migration. This 
number is higher than the total for the previous four decades, making the 
European Union a more important migration destination than the United 
States during this period (Sobotka 2009: 217). The EU also became an 
important immigrant continent.
In SEE countries migration is perceived as an important factor of 
demographic change and key driver of population development. Some 
authors characterise this field as a “new regional migration pole” (Garson 
et al. 1997), and it is generally understood that population shaped by 
migration trends is quantitatively and qualitatively highly heterogeneous.
A particular challenge to migration research, as well as the complexity of 
the issue, is the lack of good quality data and terminology, as well as the 
differences in definitions and sources used in various countries and in the 
coverage of the statistics. All this makes comparative research on migration 
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in Europe more difficult (Kupiszewska et al. 2010), especially in countries 
whose migration trends are of interest for the purpose of this paper.
Several political factors have significantly determined the migration flows 
in SEE countries in the late 20th and the first decade of the 21st century: the 
end of the socialist system in Europe, the breakup of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia as a socialist federation, and the creation of new 
states. While in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, this occurred without 
changes to the integrity of the state, the breakup of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was followed by wars that brought dramatic 
changes. Wars, as stated by Šterc and Komušanac, are “the greatest 
social and demographic destruction and direct post-war demographic 
movement to a significant degree” (Šterc and Komušanac 2011: 696).
Studies have shown that the total demographic losses, (direct 
demographic losses, losses in the birth rate and migration losses) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1992 to1995 amounted to 
approximately 1,135,966 residents, which is 25.95% of the population in 
1991, or around a quarter of the pre-war population (Tanović et al. 2014, 
245). According to the results of research conducted by Živić and Pokos 
(2004, 727), during the Homeland War in Croatia the total demographic 
war losses in the period 1991-2001 amounted to 450,276 inhabitants. In the 
structure of these losses, migration losses comprised 92.94%, war mortality 
4.93%, and natality losses 2.13%. If the mentioned demographic war losses 
are reduced by the contingent of immigrants into Croatia between 1991 
and 2001 (232,966 persons), we have a net balance of demographic losses 
comprising 217,310 persons. The war in Kosovo 1998/99 also triggered 
waves of internal and external migration; the overall number of persons 
who migrated was 1,480,000 or 71% of the total population. According 
to surveys, approximately 1,150,000 persons or 55% of the population 
temporarily left Kosovo during the conflict, and some 555,000 persons or 
27% of the Kosovo population stayed in refugee centres on at least one 
occasion (Bergouignan and Blayo 2011).
Migration from the Western Balkans to the EU is not new, but the volume 
of migration from Kosovo in early February 2015 surprised many. There is 
no precise information on the number of Albanians who have left Kosovo, 
but estimates indicate that around 100,000 have left since August 2014.
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Another consequence of these wars are the great humanitarian crises, 
followed by movements of refugees and displaced persons from Croatia 
and Bosnia to FR Yugoslavia and from Bosnia to Croatia. In the early 1990s 
the number of immigrants from the Balkans residing in a Western Europe 
country was especially high in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Bonifazi 
and Mamolo 2004: 524).
The change of the political system and disappearance of restrictive state 
control over migration triggered the departure of many people, especially 
inhabitants of Albania and Romania. Different sources suggest that 
around one million Albanians have moved temporarily or permanently 
across its borders since the beginning of the transition period (INSTAT, 2004; 
Labour Market Review of Albania, 2006). In the decade from 1990 to 2000, 
Albania lost more than 21% of its population. Albania is still the country with 
the strongest negative migratory growth (Avdeev 2011). Migrations are 
the phenomenon at the heart of economic, social, and cultural change 
in Albania over recent decades (King, 2005: 133). Romania has been 
the largest country of departure with an average of more than 200,000 
people per year. In Bulgaria, the liberalisation of passport restrictions in 
1990 created a framework for emigration. The decisive factors for asylum 
migration, however, mostly to Germany, were political instability and a 
desperate economic situation at the beginning of the 1990s (Bobeva 
1996: 37).
During the 1990s and 2000s Montenegrins emigrated to Western Europe 
as well as to some overseas countries, however, during this period, 
immigration to Montenegro was also recorded, albeit lower than the 
emigration.
Due to the problems with the availability and quality of data, it is not easy 
to give even a rough estimate of the overall scale of immigration to, and 
emigration from Serbia, but, traditionally the Republic of Serbia has been 
a country of economic emigration which has nevertheless experienced 
several inflows of immigrants consisting mainly of ethnic Serbs from the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia (Nikitović 2014). 
External migration in the Republic of Macedonia has over a long period 
of time shown a dominant tendency for emigration to Western European 
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and overseas countries. Emigration stands out as one of the societal and 
economic processes which have marked the 20th and has continued at 
an unabated pace well into the first decade of the 21st century. Recent 
migration flows from the Republic of Macedonia abroad have over the 
past four decades exhibited a tendency of continuous increase (Bonifazi 
and Mamolo 2004: 523).
Migration trends in Slovenia reflect an entirely different situation. Slovenia 
expects to remain in a pattern of growth, entirely based on immigration. 
Slovenia is the only country where natural and migratory dynamics are 
both positive and mutually reinforcing. Most immigrants are from ex-
Yugoslavia, but Slovenia is also now beginning to attract immigration from 
countries to the east (Sobotka 2009: 231).
An important stimulus to migration is the accession of selected SEE countries 
into the European Union in 2004 (Slovenia), 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) 
and 2013 (Croatia) which, in addition to the great economic crisis and 
recession that began in 2008, prompted the free movement of persons 
within EU member-states. There is a gradient of material welfare in Europe 
from the southeast and east, to northwest and west, and people migrate 
from the marginal states to the comparatively wealthier ones (Reiterer 
2010: 124) creating a new migration landscape in the EU. This changes the 
size, composition and destination of migration. Whereas Germany and 
Austria were the main destinations of east – west migration in the early 
1990s, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Britain and Ireland, all traditional 
emigration countries, became major destinations at the beginning of the 
21st century. 
The birth rates of the SEE countries are low and migration brings new 
political, cultural challenges and addressing new questions for scientists, 
policymakers and public opinion.
The data in Table 4 (showing migration flows in the period 2010-2015) 
shows that the defined trends are continuous, and that all observed 
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Table 4. SEE Migrations, Flows 2010-2015, Net migration 
Number (thousands) Rate per 1.000
Albania -7.3 -2.3









* Data not available
Source: INED Available at: http://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/graphs-maps/international-
migration/ (accessed 17 May 2015).
Impact of demographic trends on demographic 
security
The analysis of data on the defined demographic features of SEE 
countries indicates that overall population development in the observed 
SEE countries is shaped under the influence of natural and mechanical 
(migration) factors. 
The demographic legacy from the pre-transition, socialist period in most of 
these countries was unfavourable.12 The transition period that followed was 
marked by a complex and difficult social and economic transformation 
and accompanied by high unemployment rates.
Transition processes in the 1990s, which in some of the observed countries 
(Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania) were followed by the opening of the 
borders which made it possible for the population to go abroad, coupled 
12 In the analysis of demographic development of the European post-communist countries, which also includes the 
ten countries subject to this analysis, Nejašmić (2002) concludes that “the demographic legacy from the socialist 
period in most of the analyzed countries had been unfavourable. Thus, most countries entered a dramatic period of 
political change and overall social and economic transition with weakened population potential and unfavourable 
tendencies of demographic development” (Nejašmić 2002: 720).
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with the economic crisis and high unemployment rate in all analysed 
countries, prompted negative demographic trends, in regard to both 
natural and mechanical factors. 
In addition to the transition processes, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia were caught up in armed conflict and 
wars that further incited significant migration flows which had exceptionally 
negative consequences on population development. 
The economic crisis and high unemployment rates, particularly among 
young adults, continue to encourage emigration and a negative migration 
balance. This also discourages natural reproduction of the population – 
whether through the emigration of youth or a reluctance to have children 
in the given circumstances. 
The consequence is visible through the basic demographic indicators 
analysed. The region as a whole, as well as most of the analysed states 
are characterised by a continuous decrease or stagnation of the total 
population for natural and mechanical reasons. The age structure of 
the population, with the exception of Kosovo, is unfavourable and 
characterised by an old or mature population, with an aging tendency.
The analysis of the combined population shows that only Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia record a slight increase. The other countries 
are characterised by a decline, and it is noticeable that in all countries, 
with the exception of Bulgaria, the population peak was reached in 1990, 
right before the democratic and market transition began. This is also 
the time when the fertility rate fell significantly, under the replacement 
level in all observed countries, with the exception of Albania, Kosovo 
and Macedonia. This was therefore the demographic turning point, and 
there was a subsequent strong effect from the negative natural and 
mechanical factors on the population movement. The consequence was 
inevitable and has led to the accelerated population aging; Kosovo is the 
only country that deviates from the trend to a significant degree.
Total fertility rate data shows that a naturally driven change to the 
trends and demographic characteristics of the SEE countries cannot be 
expected. Countries in the region, again with the exception of Kosovo, are 
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characterised by extremely low fertility rates which are significantly below 
the replacement rate. Kosovo is ten years behind Albania with regard to 
fertility rate decline; but it can be expected that the fertility rate will decline 
until it is under the replacement level in Kosovo as well. Given Kosovo’s 
very young age structure, however, this will not automatically result in 
population decline. Kosovo is a generation from achieving population 
stabilisation due to the phenomenon of population momentum.
The slow or negative demographic development of the SEE is therefore 
evident in all three analysed components; population trends, age 
structure and the reproductive potential of the population - fertility rate.
Migration, with its influence on standard demographic development, 
also impacts demographic trends in SEE; and all analysed countries, with 
the exception of Slovenia and Macedonia, have a negative impact on 
the demographic balance. A particularly strong negative impact on the 
population growth rate was recorded in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Romania.
The negative demographic development of the population can only be 
replaced with an influx of people through migration. SEE countries, so far, 
haven’t been an attractive target destination of international migrants.
Such a demographic situation, independently or in correlation with other 
security components may have negative consequences on economic, 
political and security-related aspects of the SEE countries analysed.
In the post-war era, employment growth has been a major, and sometimes 
the dominant, contributor to economic growth in developed countries 
(Jackson and Howe 2008: 58).
Most SEE countries, as shown by analysis of demographic trends, have passed 
the period of “demographic dividend”, and in some the consequences 
of wars and emigration have had further impact on the sudden negative 
changes in the population, preventing the “demographic dividend” from 
being economically expressed and capitalised. Albania and Kosovo haven’t 
passed the period of “demographic dividend” but as a result of the significant 
emigration of young people in particular, they don’t benefit from it. 
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Due to the economic crisis and significantly high unemployment rate, the 
negative consequences of this situation have not become entirely visible. 
The relationship between the dependent and working population will 
determine both the outcome of the crisis and economic development in 
the long term.
In addition to the aging process in most SEE countries, there is also 
population stagnation and decline which has a negative impact on 
demographic dimensions of the internal market. Only in the case of 
Kosovo might more significant growth be expected, should the outflow of 
youth be stopped.
In addition to the increase in the negative correlation between the 
dependent and working population, “... aging is likely to place substantial 
demands on governmental spending for retirement and health care 
and their related costs“(Haas 2007: 116-7). Such budget-related effects 
of society aging leave fewer funds available for other social groups and 
development.
As societies age, they must transfer a rising share of income from working 
adults to non-working elders, whether through families, financial markets, 
or government budgets (Jackson and Howe 2008: 50-52). 
The elderly will not be a dominant economic force - due in large part to 
the huge share of national resources that will be steered toward them 
through public budgets (Jackson and Howe 2008: 104).
The transfer of funds from one age group to another raises the issue of 
intergenerational solidarity. Possible reactions of the employed, especially 
the younger employed, to additional financial and tax burdens is to have 
fewer children, to emigrate and seek more favourable work conditions13; 
to develop a more negative attitude towards the elderly; or to strengthen 
political competition with the elderly (Jackson, Howe 2008). These are all 
elements that could negatively affect a country’s demographic security.
13 It should be noted that unemployment is the main trigger of migration in SEE, but it is precisely under such conditions 
that a financial burden could be an additional reason for emigration. In the case of Croatia, even though it is not 
possible to accurately estimate potential migration contingents, concern about the opening of labour markets of EU 
member countries to Croatian citizens is indicative in this context. It is estimated that over 100,000 individuals, primarily 
young adults, might leave Croatia. 
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In societies marked by population aging the elderly are becoming a 
dominant political subject. In accordance with an increasing share 
of the elderly in the total population, their share in the electorate of a 
country is increasing too, thus increasing the possibility of their influencing 
the election of political representatives. “Since the elderly vote with 
greater frequency than younger adults, their electoral clout will be further 
magnified” (Jackson and Howe 2008: 50-52). 
The retired segment of the population tends to formalise its political 
participation. In SEE countries, we see a number of pensioner political parties 
and their participation in government. Their growing political influence 
means a growing influence on budget appropriation. In such a situation, 
decision makers face a dilemma in acting under the circumstances 
of the growing influence of the elderly on the one hand, and dominant 
dependence on the work potential of the young on the other.
“With aging populations, governments will be under pressure to pay for 
massive new expenditures for the elderly (and most likely in the context of 
slowing economic growth) that all other discretionary spending will likely 
be affected” (Haas 2007: 127). This means that defence and security 
expenditure within the framework of discretionary spending will be under 
more intense reduction pressure. Given the new security paradigm which 
sets new challenges for security systems in facing threats in terms of 
necessary human, technical and financial resources, this may lead to a 
weakening of defence potential and security in general.
A positive consequence of the aging population is a stronger desire to 
avoid conflict in international relations, which consequently reduces the 
possibility of international conflict. Readiness for international engagement 
in general is being reduced in parallel with the aging population14, 
however, which reduces the potential for a cooperative approach in 
international crises management. Given the demographic trends, this 
“conflict provoking fatigue” can be expected in SEE as well. 
Still, one has to bear in mind that demographic changes affect not 
only the possibility of interstate conflicts but “...by altering the domestic 
politics of a given state it becomes a security problem for its neighbours” 
14 For further information see Haas (2007: 144).
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(Nichiporuk 2000: 29). This threat is a possibility in SEE, chiefly because 
of the weak institutional structure and non-consolidated interethnic 
relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Consolidation 
of interethnic relationships is determined, among other things, by the 
different demographic dynamics of ethnic groups of Albanians and 
Macedonians in Macedonia, and Bosnians, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. We will not go any further because, as stated in the 
introduction, the ethnic issues in the region, as a particularly demanding 
component of SEE demographic security, are not the subject of this paper 
and require a separate and deeper analysis. 
SEE is a region located between demographically propulsive MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa) and Central Asia regions and Western 
Europe as desired destination for most migrants. Even though the region 
is a transit area, given the distinct demographic imbalance and the 
increasing phenomenon of migrant transit, most often illegal, the potential 
for retaining a certain number of migrants will grow, as will creation of new 
ethnic communities with associated security challenges15. 
The sparse and uneven population of the region, even in the case of 
limited migration, can lead to significant consequences for security. 
A migration influx, into some of those sparsely populated areas with its 
request for redefinition of the relationships of different communities as 
described in power transition theory, could pose security threats through 
the demographic security dilemma.
Conclusion
SEE has entered a complex demographic period that has not been 
observed in previous periods in terms of its features and negative trends 
15 The processes could be prompted in the countries of the region that are members of the EU if the European 
Commission persists in proposals to disperse illegal migrants and refugees across member states. European 
Commission – Fact Sheet, First measures under the European Agenda on Migration: Questions and Answers. Brussels, 
27 May 2015. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5038_en.htm site consulted on 18.6.2015. 
It is precisely such a dictated transfer of refugees that could lead to the creation of the so-called host communities 
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– the overall population decline, population aging, low fertility rate and 
significant migration outflow. The analysed demographic data for ten SEE 
states indicates the unfavourable trends for their economic, political and 
security contexts. 
A large and growing share of the economically dependent population, 
in comparison to the active, working population, hinders the dynamic 
economic development of society. This period is particularly important in 
the context of SEE countries regarding the significant economic lag of those 
states behind the levels of economic development recorded in the EU.
The countries of the region could face, or are already facing, a particularly 
challenging situation, which Haas describes as “...disadvantage of 
growing old before growing rich...”, which will “...greatly handicap these 
states’ ability to pay for elderly care costs” (Haas 2007: 146).
The development of society, as is shown in the analysis, depends on the 
demographic structure of the population and the demographic trends 
that characterise a society. Demographic development with negative 
characteristics and the characteristics of stagnation determines the 
overall potential of society not only for economic development but also 
for social development.
Future demographic processes, which have arisen from the current 
situation, and which are in the long-term formed on the basis of 
demographic inertia, will effect the social structure and social relationships 
in a more powerful way (Nejašmić 2002: 720). “An exceptionally high 
natural rate of decline, significant population aging and the appearance 
of a negative external migration balance confirms the conditions for a 
new period of very slow population substitution. This is further fuelled by 
the economic recession, high unemployment rate, unstable society and 
all systems within the society […]” (Šterc and Komušanac 2011: 703). 
The dominant trends of stagnation or decline of population are the processes 
with a long-term negative impact on a number of other demographic 
structures, as well as the general demographic development of society. 
Fast changing trends are not possible. Since the negative trends have 
been developing over a long period of time, a reverse process – even in 
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favourable social, economic and political conditions – would take a long 
time. Significant changes in the determined trend cannot be expected in 
the foreseeable future.
Following the analysis of the components of demographic security it can be 
concluded that the countries analysed in the region of SEE demographic 
security have the potential to adversely affect security and the adverse 
effect will continue. In this respect, the question of demographic security 
is a strategic question of future national power and security in the SEE 
countries.
Jackson and Howe warn that “…demographic aging will affect more than 
the size and structure of the population and economy. The burgeoning 
proportion of elderly in the population, the smaller size of families, and 
growing ethnic diversity promise to recast every facet of society from the 
popular culture to politics. More fundamentally, they could shift society’s 
overall direction and political agenda” (Jackson and Howe 2008: 95).
In the given circumstances, strategic planning for population development 
is particularly important, due to the needs of economic development but 
also the development of society in general. 
Special attention should be paid to demographic policies that will slow 
population decline and aging, ensure migration flow management and 
encourage investments in human capital; economic policies that respond 
to the changes in the labour contingent and internal market and possible 
negative effects conditioned by demographic changes; and security 
policies that will harmonise the structure and goals of the security system 
with new demographic realities.
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